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ABSTRACT
The article discusses the Hungarian foreign policy in the last ten years.
The author states the three main thrusts of the Hungarian foreign policy:
the North-Atlantic and European orientation; the regional policy; and,
third, supporting ethnic Hungarians in neighboring states. These three
directions are analyzed in each of the three Hungarian governments
between the period 1990-2000. The author maintains that there was a
continuity in matters of national interest, although small differences in the
foreign policy could be observed between the three governments. The
author points out the differences between the Antall and Horn govern-
ments in the policies towards regionalism. Finally, the author reviews Mr.
Orbán's foreign policy, which stresses continuity in each of the three
areas. The author also underlines the strategic partnership with Croatia,
which thus far lacks content.
Ten years have elapsed since the political transition of 1990.
Since then, we have had three free and democratic elections in
Hungary, all of which resulted in a changing of the guard. The
programs of the particular governments showed substantial differ-
ences in sectoral policies. There is, perhaps, just one governmen-
tal sphere where there has been remarkable continuity; and that
is foreign policy. The strategic directions of the foreign policy of
the Hungarian state were crucially determined by the program of
the first democratic government. The principles laid down there
appear to have stood the test of time. Naturally, there have been
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divergences, but at that time the tripartite character of the foreign
policy orientation of a newly independent Hungary - a feature that
has been valid ever since - was originally drafted..
What are those three main directions? The first to be men-
tioned is the European - North-Atlantic orientation, which repre-
sented a radical break from the Soviet orientation of the pre-1990
period. For this to occur, the world political environment had to
undergo a radical shift, which began with the Bush-Gorbachev
talks of 1989 in Malta, the fall of the Berlin Wall marking one of
the high points in that process. That shift was, at the same time,
an expression of sovereign will, given that the Soviet Union still
existed in 1990. It expressed the desire of the Hungarian people
to return to where it had always belonged; namely, to the family
of Western European civilizations.
The second main direction was the special focus given to the
regional policy of the country. This expressed the natural attach-
ment which had, for centuries, bound it to its surrounding neigh-
bors. This aspiration also reflected the recognition that the coun-
try could not be uprooted from its environment, that it could not
hope to prosper unless it strove to cooperate with its neighbors -
neighbors with which it had frequently been in conflict in the
course of history, but had, in many instances, also formed
alliances. 
The third direction was to embrace the cause of the ethnic
Hungarian minorities living across the border, which expressed the
desire of Hungarian society to redefine the interests of the
Hungarian nation, residing in many countries, after almost half a
century of artificial separation and a lack of communication post-
1945.  Here one must also take into account the circumstance
that in the pre-1990 period - despite the clauses concerning the
protection of minorities in the peace treaties ending World War
One, and the proclamations of the principles of the “Socialist
Community” (a product of the post-World War Two constellation)
and of “proletarian internationalism” - there had been no gener-
al improvement in the situation of national minorities in Eastern
Europe, including the ethnic Hungarian minority. All these factors
engendered a demand for radical changes in this area.
The first democratic government realistically assessed and
charted the foreign policy course of the Hungarian state. This is
eloquently attested to by the fact that this tripartite orientation has
continued to command a broad consensus between successive
governments and their oppositions, and that even changes of gov-
ernment have not produced any seismic shifts in this regard,
although there may have been certain shifts in emphasis.
In this article, I will attempt to show the similarities and differ-
ences among the foreign policy programs of the three govern-

























been most perceptible.  I will also attempt to draw conclusions as
to which aspects  - in the course of the implementation of a for-
eign policy strategy that has proved fundamentally correct - have
proved durable and valid, and which have proved to have been
mistakes and require correction.  Let us then examine the pro-
grams of the particular governments one by one.
I. The foreign policy program of the Antall (Boross) government
(1990-1994)
The program of the HDF-ISP-CDPP1 government, which was
known as “a program of national renewal” and which came to
power in 1990 as the result of the first democratic elections may,
in many respects, be regarded as the program of political transi-
tion, as it charted the main directions and priorities in the partic-
ular governmental areas and in foreign policy as well.
As in all other areas, this governmental program also repre-
sented a drastic change in the area of foreign policy, compared
to the previous period, even taking into account the fact that the
Németh government2 (the last “Socialist” government), which was
in power between 1989-90, proved very courageous in the for-
eign policy area.  It utilized the available opportunities to expand
the country’s room for maneuver by forging links, for example,
with countries which had previously been regarded as taboo
(Israel, South Korea, Republic of South Africa, etc.) and by open-
ly defying – based upon the interests of the country - some of its
allies of that time (i.e. in the decision to release East German cit-
izens).
The foreign policy program of the Antall government
declares: “The Republic of Hungary pursues an independent for-
eign policy based upon the precedence of national interests, with
the aim of completely restoring our national sovereignty. We
intend to express and realize our national interests in harmony
with  European interests and values, and with international reali-
ties. Under the conditions of the political transition, on new foun-
dations - taking into account the new requirements and opportu-
nities arising from the altered international situation - we strive to
forge and maintain a balanced system of international relations.”3
To be sure, this represented a radical break with the policies pur-
sued up to that point and with the existing alliance relations, sig-
naling at the same time Hungary’s intention to again assume its
place in the family of advanced democratic European countries.
The government program identified the broadest possible
involvement in the European integration processes as the top pri-
ority foreign policy goal. The reason for this was the need to
ensure the foreign policy, security, and economic conditions nec-
essary for the implementation of the comprehensive moderniza-
tion program facing the country. Owing to the dramatic changes119
occurring in the Eastern European region and in the European-
Atlantic region - then in the process of formation - the European-
Atlantic community of interests was considered pivotal for
Hungarian foreign policy, and it was here that foreign policy activ-
ity was focused.  Hungary was predestined to travel this road by
virtue of historical, cultural, and geographical reasons, and also
because its political and economic interests dictated such a
course.
Within the context of this so-called Euro-Atlantic orientation,
contacts were made with the European Communities (the prede-
cessor of the European Union), and with NATO, the Western-
European Union, and EFTA. A demand was also voiced for
Hungary to establish institutional relations with these integration
organizations. While the government program still mentions
Comecon, since it still existed back then and Hungary was a
member of the economic grouping of the eastern bloc, the
emphasis was already on interests. (A short time later, Comecon
announced its dissolution). In 1990, Hungary also declared its
intention to leave the Warsaw Pact. Originally, a longer period
was envisaged for this: i.e. the government wished to leave the
military structure by December 31, 1991. That plan was thwarted
by the fact that the organization was dissolved prior to that date.
The government program’s enumeration of the bilateral rela-
tions which were of primary importance was also designed to indi-
cate its Euro-Atlantic orientation. The order speaks for itself:
Germany (key role), United States (special treatment), France (new
stage in relations), Italy (reliable, stable partner), Austria (excep-
tionally good neighborly relations), Great Britain (important direc-
tion), Japan (important interests), Soviet Union (key player in the
region). The desire to develop economic cooperation was given
important, indeed crucial, emphasis in every single relation.
Also flowing organically from the European orientation was
the re-formulation of regional policy, or “neighborhood policy”,
as it is sometimes called. In this area, too, the Antall government
broke with the previously employed ideological clichés, placing
the focus on neighborhood policy as well, and on the opportuni-
ty and the need to assert national interests.  It tended to adhere to
the view that since Hungary is situated midway between the West
and the East, its intermediary position as a “ferry county”4 allows
it to exploit its geographical and political situation.  Also impor-
tant was the fact that it lies at the juncture of the great European
cultures and language families and that, as a reformist country, it
had forged substantive and closer relations with the West, unlike
the rest of the “Socialist” countries, while also preserving its close
relations with the eastern bloc countries.  Hungary’s goal was to


























to use the pre-existent regional groupings as well as those estab-
lished at that time.
For this reason, the program devoted a special section to the
neighborhood, even mentioning some countries in the region by
name: the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (preserving the
level of relations attained, reaching a satisfactory settlement of
outstanding issues – i.e. the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros  hydroelectric
dam project), Poland (important partner), Romania (normalizing
relations), Yugoslavia (problem-free relations).
The third strategic direction defined in the government pro-
gram was the ensuring of human rights, more specifically, minor-
ity rights; first and foremost, enforcement and support of the rights
of the ethnic Hungarian minorities living across the border. The
program noted that the Hungarian state bore a responsibility for
the survival of the Hungarian nation as a cultural and ethnic com-
munity. “That is why we stand up - respecting the existing interna-
tional treaties, in the spirit of those treaties and also in conformi-
ty with the promises made by the governments of the neighboring
states - for the observance of the rights of the Hungarian com-
munity living beyond our borders, including the observance of
self-determination (within the framework of this, the establishment
of cultural autonomy).”5 In the interest of achieving this goal, the
program also counted on the support of the European institutions.
It proceeded on the assumption that, in the near future, it would
be possible to find a pan-European institutional solution to the
protection of the rights of minorities, including the establishment
of a protection monitoring system. In the spirit of balance and rec-
iprocity, the government program affirmed that it also accorded
special attention to the issue of Hungary’s own national, ethnic,
linguistic and religious minorities.
The program also mentioned some specific planned meas-
ures designed to serve the unity of the Hungarian nation, such as
ensuring people of Hungarian citizenship the right to vote abroad
and the extension of the institution of dual citizenship. This is
where we come across the first use, in the language of Hungarian
foreign policy, of the term “national policy”, the implementation of
which the government formed a special agency: the Office for
Cross-Border Hungarians.
Viewing the principal foreign policy moves of the Antall gov-
ernment, it must be stated that it strove to implement the provi-
sions of the government program.
1. Euro-Atlantic orientation and integration
1991 witnessed the dissolution of both Comecon and the
Warsaw Pact; in fact, the latter was dissolved at its Budapest ses-
sion. In 1991, Hungary signed a so-called European Agreement



































ciation. In the spring of 1994, (citing the relevant “O” article of
the Maastricht Treaty) it officially applied for membership in the
EC. In 1993, it became a party to the NATO-initiated security pol-
icy organization, Partnership for Peace.
2. Regional policy
In 1991, it proposed the establishment of a cooperation
involving Poland and Czechoslovakia, a project it launched in
Visegrád, near Budapest, under the name “The Visegrád Three”.
It actively supported efforts to reach a negotiated settlement to the
Yugoslav internal political crisis.  Pointing out that the south Slav
peoples had opted for self-determination, it argued from 1991 on
for international recognition of the new states emerging from the
ruins of the disintegrating country, and, in fact took the lead in
establishing diplomatic relations with these countries. In 1992, it
was an active participant in the formation of CEFTA6. In 1992, it
signed a so-called “basic treaty” with Ukraine, and began prepa-
rations for similar treaties with Romania and Slovakia (the signing
of which occurred under the Horn administration).
3. Ethnic Hungarian minorities
It established institutional relations with the legitimate organi-
zations of the ethnic Hungarian minority living across the border.
It took the initiative, within the framework of the CSCE, of extend-
ing the international protection of minorities (i.e. the dispatching
of observer missions to Vojvodina and Kosovo). It signed a
Declaration on the Protection of Minorities with Ukraine, to which,
subsequently, Croatia and Slovenia also acceded. In 1993, the
Hungarian Parliament enacted a law on the protection of minori-
ties, which institutionalized personal and cultural autonomy.
II. The foreign policy program of the Horn government (1994-
1998)
The program of the HSP-AFD7 government, which took office
in 1994, also devotes considerable attention to foreign policy;
however, while its predecessor had indulged in some lofty and
occasionally grandiose statements (as the voice of the first demo-
cratic government, expressing the aspirations of a once more gen-
uinely independent country), this document uses a far more “prag-
matic” language to describe the principal foreign policy goals of
the government which, incidentally, were quite similar to those of
the previous administration.
It stated that Hungary was less able to shape its international
environment due to the capabilities of that international environ-
ment and the changes intended to exert influence on the country.
“Hence, Hungarian foreign policy must, above all, strive to use to
the fullest possible advantage the opportunities arising from the122
international conditions, while taking into account the objective
constraints. At the same time, within the bounds of the existing
possibilities, just how Hungary’s relations with the states that mat-
ter to it are going to develop, whether it is able to accede (and if
so, under what conditions) to the various country groupings, inter-
national organizations, and institutions, largely depends on the
correct choice of emphases, the suitability of the instrumentalities,
and an appropriate style.”8
Safeguarding the security of the country, ensuring the external
resources and markets indispensable to the economy, promoting
the development of an authentic country image, and encouraging
FDI (foreign direct investment) in Hungary are just some of the for-
eign policy goals the document identified. The government pro-
gram reiterates, in effect, the priorities of the foreign policy pro-
gram and main courses of action of the previous administration.
“The government strives to ensure the close attachment of
Hungary to the advanced countries and its integration into the
Euro-Atlantic organizations, to forge good-neighborly relations
with the states of our region, and to support cross-border
Hungarians in their ambition to have their rights recognized, guar-
anteed, and duly observed in practice, in accordance with the
international documents and norms.”9 The government stated that
there was a close inter-dependence and reciprocity among these
three directions of activity; therefore, it pronounced them to be of
equal importance. The Horn government also stressed the prece-
dence of economic interests in the crafting of foreign policy.
From the standpoint of the integration efforts, the government
program ascribed an absolutely crucial importance to Hungary’s
admittance to the European Union at the earliest possible date
and under the most favorable terms possible. Until the issue of
accession was put on the agenda, it set itself the goal of utilizing
to the fullest possible degree the opportunities and benefits accru-
ing from that association. The program stressed the importance of
preparing the country as best it could for this accession, and it was
with this aim in mind that considerable importance was placed
upon increasing the competitiveness of the economy, harmonizing
the legal system, enforcing the requirements of European political
culture, and educating the public.  The government’s goal was to
ensure that the accession negotiations began before the end of
the parliamentary term.
It also described the achievement of NATO membership as a
strategic goal. To this end, it envisaged close cooperation with the
North-Atlantic Cooperation Council in the Partnership for Peace
programs, considering it a prerequisite for NATO membership.
The program did not elaborate on bilateral relations with the
advanced countries, but it did enumerate the international inte-


































tries belonged, which included the European Union, NATO, and
the OECD.
Developing relations with Hungary’s neighbors was identified
as a priority area. According to the philosophy of the government
program, this was equally important to the stability of the region,
the economic development of the country, and the expansion of
its market possibilities. The program stated that, unless Hungary’s
relations with its neighbors were normalized, there was also no
opportunity for any improvement in the plight of the ethnic
Hungarian minorities living there. And, finally, it also stated that
the establishment of well-regulated relations was also indispensa-
ble from the standpoint of the international perception of the
country and of Western support for its integration efforts. It envis-
aged some initiatives and announced confidence-building meas-
ures. The Horn government intended to pay special attention to
relations with Slovakia and Romania, declaring its readiness to
conclude so-called basic treaties with these countries. There was
another neighbor that was accorded a special place in the gov-
ernment program, and that was Yugoslavia, with which the gov-
ernment declared itself ready to improve relations once the
Yugoslav crisis was over. As far as relations in the region were con-
cerned, the program also stressed here the priority of economic
considerations, mentioning, at the same time, the importance of
trans-frontier relations, and regional and sub-regional forms of
cooperation, such as the CEI10, the Visegrád Cooperation, the
Alps-Adriatic Working Group, the Carpathians Euroregion, etc.
The government intended to pay great attention to the support
of cross-border Hungarians, which is the duty of every Hungarian
government as laid down in the Constitution. It emphasized that,
on the one hand, it supported the enforcement of minority rights
and the autonomy aspirations which conformed to European
norms, but, on the other hand, it considered it important that the
Hungarian community beyond the border should grow stronger in
economic terms as well. The government sought to advance the
achievement of this goal both in the bilateral area (“dialogue with
the neighbors”) and in the multilateral area (“securing interna-
tional support”). The Horn cabinet also considered the establish-
ment of an effective international system for the protection of
minorities to be absolutely vital, declaring that no official
Hungarian position could be determined without taking into
account the opinion of the organizations of cross-border
Hungarians.
The Horn administration implemented in practice and devel-
oped further the foreign policy ambitions which had now been



























In 1994, the treaty of association concluded with the EC
came into force, and its implementation was begun. In 1996, an
agency to direct and coordinate the tasks connected with the inte-
gration - the State Secretariat for Integration - was formed within
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (Initially, it was in charge of man-
aging both the EU and the NATO accession process, with NATO
affairs subsequently removed from its competence.) In the course
of 1996-97, the government prepared the reply to be given to the
EU questionnaire; as a result, the relevant agencies of the EU
formed a favorable country opinion.  This led to an invitation to
Hungary in 1997 to participate in accession talks, which began in
the spring of 1998. In 1997, NATO also decided to invite
Hungary to become a member. In the autumn of 1997, a suc-
cessful referendum was held, which supported NATO member-
ship.
2. Neighborhood policy
In 1995-96, it concluded basic treaties with Slovakia and
Romania, and rapidly developed bilateral relations with the newly
independent Yugoslav successor states, concluding several
treaties with them. It established new diplomatic missions in the
region, i.e. Sarajevo, Cluj (Kolozsvár). New Euroregions came
into being between Hungary and Austria, and between Yugoslavia
and Romania, respectively CEFTA gained new members, and it
was decided to establish a strategic cooperation with Poland.
3. Policy towards Hungarians
The basic treaties concluded with Slovakia and Romania also
contained some provisions on the protection of minorities. An
agreement on the protection of minorities was concluded with
Croatia in 1995 and another was signed in 1996 with Slovenia.
In 1996, the first Hungarian-Hungarian conference occurred, a
discussion forum involving Hungarian political leaders based in
Hungary and their cross-border counterparts. 
III. The foreign policy moves and actions of the first two democratic
governments - differences and similarities
The early 1990s were characterized by great transformations
and movements. It was a heady period throughout Europe, with
German reunification setting the basic trend. In that rapidly
changing environment, the Antall administration took a funda-
mentally correct view of the country’s opportunities and room for
maneuver when framing its principal foreign policy objectives,
and went about implementing them with great enthusiasm. In
1991, the Yugoslav crisis erupted; the armed conflict was of great
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significance to Hungary - history assigned to it a larger role than
its size, influence, and strength would otherwise have dictated.
There was a flurry of international contacts; during this period, the
leaders of the major powers would regularly consult Prime
Minister Antall.
Early in 1991, the new government, as a result of its speedy
negotiations, concluded the association agreement with the EC,
which launched Hungary’s integration into the community of
advanced European countries. But the burgeoning close cooper-
ation was overshadowed by what was arguably the greatest for-
eign policy fiasco of the Antall government; namely, the so-called
“Kalashnikov affair”, the sale of weapons to Croatia. This caused
revulsion in numerous Western countries, but especially among
Hungary’s neighbors, as it was proved that Hungary had actively
interfered in the internal affairs of a neighboring country. The sit-
uation was further complicated by the fact that the Prime Minister
himself and certain senior politicians of the HDF made ambigu-
ous statements open to misconstruction concerning the status and
sovereignty of Vojvodina. This development was not very helpful in
the international lobbying being carried out for the protection of
the rights of cross-border ethnic Hungarians, and it created mis-
understandings of even the most well-intentioned gestures of the
Hungarian government towards its notoriously sensitive neigh-
bors. The moves made towards Romania and Slovakia, at that
time heading toward independence, did not always meet with an
unqualified positive response.
Along with the Euro-Atlantic integration process - which was
proceeding in a fairly smooth fashion - the Antall government took
the initiative in its relations with the neighboring countries. It rein-
forced the Hungarian-Polish and Hungarian-Czech cooperation,
both of which had historical and traditional ties. The Antall gov-
ernment embraced and supported the international aspirations of
Ukraine, also proceeding towards independence at that time. It
also made great efforts to live up to the regional hub role envis-
aged and undertaken in the government program, building on the
leading Western nations’ sympathy for Hungary, and especially on
the personal support of Chancellor Kohl. But Hungary’s pioneer-
ing, special role swiftly began to fade due to certain strong reac-
tions to this ineptly articulated concept.  Explaining the situation of
ethnic Hungarian minorities and attempting to gain international
assistance to help improve their position was getting more and
more difficult. At the International Conference on Yugoslavia held
in London, for instance, virtually all the efforts made towards this
end proved fruitless. This prompted the government to try and
attain its goals on a bilateral basis, which is what led to the
Hungarian-Ukrainian declaration on national minorities, to the

























sequently, to the crafting of the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty
and the negotiations with Yugoslavia regarding the future fate of
the ethnic Hungarian minority.
Hungary’s opportunities for asserting its foreign policy inter-
ests were also not helped by the return home and reburial, in
1993, of the remains of the former Regent Miklós Horthy. In spite
of the government’s insistence that it was a purely humanitarian
act and a family affair, the attendance at the funeral of some
prominent members of the government sent a wrong signal.
Hungary’s neighbors watched with anxiety as the Hungarian gov-
ernment demonstrated its solidarity with a historical personage
who is deeply unpopular in the region.
In the last phase of its term, the Antall government - or rather,
the Boross government, as it was known by then - once again
turned towards the Euro-Atlantic integration, submitting to the EU
the official application for accession.
The Horn government, which took office in 1994, also began
implementing its foreign policy strategy with great energy.  First, it
buttressed the Foreign Ministry division in charge of directing the
Euro-Atlantic integration process, establishing a special unit to
oversee it. In 1996, it drafted a reply, running to thousands of
pages, to the so-called “country questionnaire” of the EU. As a
result of the successful preparation, the EU included Hungary in
1997 in the group of applicant countries with which it intended to
begin accession negotiations. The beginning of the accession
negotiations - which are still continuing - occurred at the end of
March, 1998. Speaking for the Hungarian government, Minister
of Foreign Affairs László Kovács declared in the so-called
Opening Statement which embodied the Hungarian position:
“The commencement of accession negotiations with the EU has a
historic significance to the Republic of Hungary. The past, culture,
and choice of values of the Hungarian people have, for a thou-
sand years now, had a European attachment to them.  (...) The
political transition and the social-economic transformation that
has occurred have created the indispensable political and eco-
nomic preconditions of accession. According to our conviction,
the historic goal which, proposed and continuously represented by
the freely elected Hungarian governments, commands the con-
sensus of the parliamentary parties and the comprehensive sup-
port of public opinion - namely, European integration across the
full range - is achievable on the basis of these preconditions.”11
In 1996, the Horn cabinet - complying with the request of the
leading countries of NATO, primarily the US, dispatched a
Hungarian contingent to the IFOR, and subsequently the SFOR
forces12 stationed in Bosnia. This was a major factor in the deci-
sion to place the option of Hungary’s NATO membership on the


































ference of the NATO foreign ministers, in the summer of 1998.
Prior to that, in the autumn of 1997, a successful referendum was
held which produced a 75 per cent vote in favor of NATO mem-
bership. The accession document was then signed by the next
government, in the spring of 1999, at NATO’s 50th anniversary
celebrations, in Independence, in the United States.
It is in the area of neighborhood policy that we see the most
salient difference in the foreign policy activities of the Antall and
the Horn governments. Here, the administration that held power
between 1994-98 consciously pursued a different style and
emphasis, breaking with the ideological phraseology and
ambiguous utterances that had so irritated the neighbors. There
was a highly conscious endeavor to settle any outstanding issues
and to conclude agreements. This endeavor has enjoyed some
successes and also some failures. The conclusion of the so-called
basic treaties with Slovakia (1995) and with Romania (1996) must
be considered a success, as they settled, in a relatively reassuring
fashion, the enforcement - within the possible limitations - of the
rights of the numerous ethnic Hungarian minorities inhabiting
those countries, and removed the minority issue from the list of
issues burdening bilateral relations. It is not too extravagant to
claim that these basic treaties have played a large role in creating
the kind of political climate which has allowed the ethnic
Hungarian minorities to become governmental factors both in
Slovakia and in Romania. The treatment of the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros dispute and the submission of the issue to the
International Court of Justice in the Hague proved to be a fiasco.
Prime Minister Gyula Horn was the first to have paid a visit to the
newly independent Yugoslav successor states, Slovenia and
Croatia. As a sign of goodwill, he also made a visit to Yugoslavia.
The government actions taken in furtherance of the interests
of ethnic Hungarians living across the border were a continuation
of the efforts of the previous government, and, on balance, have
proved more successful. In addition to the Hungarian-Slovak and
Hungarian-Romanian basic treaties previously mentioned, the
government signed, in 1995, an express treaty on the protection
of minorities with Croatia, and a similar one with Slovenia in
1996. These may rightfully be described as exemplary. Based
upon these actions, Hungary has shown in practice that it has an
interest in the stability of the region and in the mutual reconcilia-
tion of peoples, a fact that has been greatly instrumental in
prompting the EU and NATO to make the aforementioned deci-
sions.
IV. The foreign policy program of the Orbán government
The introduction of the foreign policy section of the govern-

























notes with satisfaction that “with the NATO membership, Hungary
has finally obtained a place in the community of advanced
Western democracies.”13 Referring to the other integration, it
points out that “the main question of accession to the Union is
whether we will succeed (...) in building a country capable of
using the possibilities of the Union, or whether we allow ourselves
to be pushed to the margins of Europe (...) Thus the aim of the
negotiations carried on with the EU is, by now, to make sure that
the assertion of our economic interests becomes the focus (...) It
is a legitimate expectation that the Hungarian government should
represent the national interests in a consistent and resolute man-
ner.”14
The program makes an explicit commitment to continuity:
“The government embraces as its own and carries forward the
three main directions of the foreign policy ambitions adopted by
national consensus after the political transition - to wit, Euro-
Atlantic integration, good-neighborly policies designed to ensure
regional stability, and a national policy which encompasses the
support of ethnic Hungarians living across the border.”15 The gov-
ernment emphasized the need to balance these goals, stating that
these goals presuppose each other and are closely interdepen-
dent. The document states with great emphasis that the decision
on Hungary’s admission to NATO and the invitation to accession
talks with the EU are the result of the consistency of the foreign
policy goals and the national consensus underlying them. The
government showed itself desirous of maintaining the consensus,
declaring that “(...) the responsibility for building a consensus lies
mainly with the government.”16
Within the three main directions, emphasis is given to the con-
tinuation of the accession negotiations, and to attempts to secure
the most advantageous possible terms, with accession itself to
take place in 200217; advancing the European unification
process; bolstering stability in Central and Eastern Europe; deep-
ening cooperation among the countries of the region; respect for
the basic treaties concluded; increasing regional cooperation;
namely, the strengthening of CEFTA; helping the ethnic Hungarian
minorities to remain in their land of birth; carrying on the institu-
tional dialogue with the Hungarian organizations; and increasing
the financial assistance being given to them.
So, in foreign policy, the Orbán cabinet placed the emphasis
on continuity, embarking on its activity in that spirit. Although the
last two years are not sufficient to allow us to draw any final con-
clusions, certain observations can be made at this early stage. It
is in the realm of the integration policy that we see the continuity
at its strongest, but it appears that the course being pursued in the
neighborhood policy field has been fairly consistent as well. The


































Visegrád Cooperation - which, in recent years, has been in a state
of suspended animation -, and seems to be succeeding. It has
declared a strategic partnership with Croatia, which, however,
thus far lacks content. 
On balance, it can be argued that the predictability and con-
structive character of Hungarian foreign policy has been of great
benefit to Hungary’s fortunes, as the advanced Western countries
as well as our neighbors have acknowledged this trend and shown
appreciation. Today Hungary is an island of stability in the region,
and enjoys an orderly and developing fabric of relations with all
its neighbors except Yugoslavia (due to factors outside Hungary’s
control). It is a member of NATO, a potential first-wave entrant
into the EU, a party to nearly all the regional organizations, and
the political organizations of the ethnic Hungarian minority are in
power in Slovakia and in Romania. In regard to the other neigh-
bors, we have treaties guaranteeing their rights, and institutional
relations have been forged between the mother country and the
ethnic Hungarians living across the border.
It is not overstating the case to conclude that Hungary’s pres-
ent international standing would be quite different if the three
changes of government had produced a drastically or even par-
tially new foreign policy course, disrupting thereby the processes
that have survived successive governmental terms.
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